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Abstract 
 
We demonstrate that multi-criteria analysis (MCA), though initially developed in the operations 
research field, can be usefully applied within the context of the stakeholder-driven or institutional 
approach to transport project evaluation. We first compare the features of the institutional and neo-
classical approaches to economic evaluation. We then identify a number of conditions to be fulfilled for 
the institutional approach to result in a social optimum that is neutral from a distributional perspective. 
Such an optimum may not have been intentionally pursued, but may eventually arise as a by-product of 
the actions of self-interested, individual stakeholder groups. We illustrate the relevance of our approach 
through a number of recent case studies. Policy makers can use our findings as an input for designing 
formal decision-making processes, geared towards including stakeholder objectives in transport project 
evaluation. 
 
Keywords: Multi-criteria analysis; Multi-criteria decision aid; Institutions; Institutional approach; 
Stakeholder. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Large transport projects usually require substantial investment funding from both 
public and private sources. They often also affect the economic and environmental 
characteristics of the locations where they are built. In many cases, large-scale projects 
affect individual stakeholder groups in idiosyncratic ways. Such stakeholder groups 
usually have a preference for voicing their views and participating in the decision-
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making processes preceding actual project approval, namely at the stage when 
alternative project alternatives or options are assessed. 
 Decision makers can choose among a large number of evaluation techniques to assess 
transport projects, including, inter alia, social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), multi-
criteria analysis (MCA), cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), regional economic impact 
study (REIS) and environmental impact assessment (EIA). The basic principles 
underlying each of these methods are very specific.  
For example, SCBA is ultimately an expression of neo-classical welfare economics, 
whereby marginal benefits (utility increases) are compared with marginal costs (utility 
losses). Values (expressed in monetary terms) are based on consumer values as 
expressed by the consumer willingness-to-pay or derived in another way (e.g., using 
revealed preference or stated preference methods).  
MCA originated in the operations research field (Charness and Cooper, 1961). Here, 
alternatives are evaluated on a set of criteria reflecting the decision-maker’s objectives, 
and ranked on the basis of an aggregation procedure. Scores achieved do not necessarily 
need to be conveyed in monetary terms, but can simply be expressed in physical units or 
in qualitative terms.  
CEA, which stems from research in the military and space industries, aims at 
selecting the least-cost alternative that achieves a predefined level of effectiveness. The 
effectiveness measure reflects the operationalisation of a specific policy objective. 
However, the policy objective itself is preset, and not subject to a critical evaluation of 
its desirability (e.g., whether benefits actually exceed costs).  
The (regional) economic impact study (REIS) bears some similarities with Adam 
Smith’s classic economics view, which focused on the role of production. The REIS 
attempts to measure the additional production (or value added) causally linked to a 
project. 
EIA became established as an evaluation tool in its own right as Goudzwaard’s (1970) 
and Hueting’s (1970) ideas of “new scarcity” were gaining ground. EIA describes the 
possible impacts a project may have on the natural environment (fauna, flora, air, soil, 
water, landscape, etc.) and on human health, so that decision makers can consider these 
effects when deciding on accepting, amending or rejecting a project. 
In recent years, several attempts have been undertaken to enhance the “participative 
character” of the above evaluation methods, see Stagl (2007) for an excellent overview. 
In each case, the intent has been to enrich the evaluation process with a substantive 
injection of stakeholder, expert and/or citizen participation. Here, “deliberative 
monetary evaluation” involves formal deliberation techniques to assign a monetary 
value to environmental impacts (Spash, 2001). “Social multi-criteria evaluation” 
combines participatory techniques and MCA to aid decision-making, thereby taking into 
account conflicting interests and multiple criteria (Munda, 2004). In the “three-stage 
MCA”, various relevant stakeholders select criteria, followed by experts presenting 
information and measuring impacts, and citizen panels exploring values by comparing 
the numerical overall results with their own holistic judgement (Renn et al., 1993). 
“Multi-criteria mapping” is an interview-based MCA, meant to elicit and document 
technical and evaluative judgements on the expected performance of alternatives (Renn 
et al., 1993). “Deliberative mapping” combines participatory techniques and MCA to 
aid decision-making (Davies et al., 2003). Finally, “stakeholder decision analysis” 
combines the use of group-level deliberation techniques and (qualitative) MCA 
(Burgess, 2000).  
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It should be noted, however, that participative evaluation processes can be introduced 
without necessarily adopting formal evaluation instruments such as MCA and SCBA. 
Typical examples of such participative processes include the French and Belgian 
systems of “débat public”, as well as the Swiss confirmative referendum.  
The present article focuses on the institutional theory approach to evaluation. First, we 
show that MCA, though stemming from operations research, can be usefully linked to 
the stakeholder-driven or institutional approach to project evaluation (section 2). 
Second, we argue that even SCBA, derived from neo-classical economics, includes 
some institutional features, albeit only implicitly (section 3). Third, we discuss the 
possibility that a stakeholder-driven approach will help achieving a social optimum 
(section 4). Finally, we assess the potential contribution of MCA to actually 
implementing a stakeholder-driven approach to transport project evaluation, building 
upon a number of recent case studies (section 5). 
 
 
2. MCA and the institutional approach to project evaluation: stakeholders as the 
linking pin 
 
There are various definitions of the “institution” concept. First, the behavioural or old 
Veblenian perspective (Veblen, 1919) defines institutions as “settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of men”. Second, North (1990) defines institutions as the 
“rules of the game” Third, Hodgson (2006) defines institutions in more specific terms 
as “durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions” (Hodgson, 2006). The approach adopted in the present paper is consistent 
with the second and third definitions above. We view institutions as “decision 
procedures”, i.e., as sets of rules enabling a group or society to transform individual 
preferences into collective preferences. Although the three above definitions may on the 
surface seem rather different, they do share a number of common elements.  
A first common element is that institutions are meant to reduce - or improve control 
over - environmental uncertainty. Here, the “environment”, in the form of individual or 
stakeholder preferences needs to be understood and interpreted properly. The belief 
systems of the decision makers play an important role in the interpretative activity. 
Building upon this interpretative activity, an institution is established, e.g., through a 
sequence of actual decisions. The former activity corresponds to the internal 
representation of the institution in the decision makers’ minds, whereas the latter can be 
viewed as its external representation.  
A second commonality, largely the consequence of the first common element, is that 
institutions create both constraints and incentives guiding human behaviour (Hodgson, 
2006). Institutions do limit the options available to an individual or organization, but 
they may also trigger new types of human and organizational behaviour. By 
constraining behaviour, institutions can create a situation of socio-economic stability 
(i.e., an equilibrium). However, by providing incentives, institutions can contribute to 
moulding actors’ beliefs and preferences, as well as their capabilities and behaviour. 
Hence, institutions can trigger change and provide a pathway towards new equilibria. 
Indeed, through institutions, individual and collective beliefs and preferences co-evolve 
(North, 2005). Such co-evolution builds upon an initial equilibrium and is path-
dependent (North, 2005; Amendola and Gaffard, 1998). However, it is important to 
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understand that the formal creation or adaptation of the institution (or in our case the 
application of a decision procedure to a particular decision making challenge) does not 
lead to a permanent equilibrium, but only to a “temporary” one. A temporary 
equilibrium differs from the traditional neo-classical equilibrium, i.e., the situation 
whereby economic agents have no incentive to change their economic behaviour. 
Rather, the temporary equilibrium merely reflects a state of temporary order, i.e., a state 
of affairs providing temporary satisfaction to economic actors. During this period in 
which economic actors feel satisfied, the tension to change the state of affairs is reduced 
(weakened). Weak tension results from “concessions” made by each stakeholder 
involved in the decision making process, and from the transaction costs to be incurred in 
order to ameliorate further the present situation through new negotiations. 
The creation of a temporary equilibrium, i.e., a situation of temporary stability, can be 
considered as the public good component associated with the institution. We noted 
above that in the present paper we will focus our attention on one specific form of 
institution, namely the systematic application of a decision procedure, such as multi-
stakeholder MCA, assuming that all affected stakeholders were considered in 
establishing this procedure (see infra).  
The perceived beneficial character of an equilibrium situation is consistent with 
Commons’ (1934) old-institutionalism view that society can be described as a complex 
cluster of multiple actors (i.e., stakeholder groups) with interests that partly conflict and 
partly converge. These stakeholder groups interact among each other through a variety 
of “trade or social relations”. Such interactions trigger social conflicts and the essence 
of economics is then to suggest efficient ways to govern these conflicts. The second and 
third above views on institutions assume the presence of conflicts as well as some 
efficiency of institutions at managing such conflicts. 
In the 1980s, the strategic management literature explicitly introduced the notion of 
stakeholder and stakeholder management. Freeman (1984:86) defined a stakeholder as 
“any group or individual that can affect or is affected by the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives”. Since then, numerous authors have expanded on the 
stakeholder concept, and stakeholder management has become a separate sub-discipline 
in the strategic management field. 
Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) can be a tool for active stakeholder management in 
cases whereby several strategic options need to be assessed, or a specific project can be 
implemented in different ways (thereby also affecting stakeholders differently). 
Effective stakeholder management through MCA adoption can take various forms. In 
principle, all relevant effects should be taken into account in an MCA. An effect is 
considered relevant if it affects the values considered important by at least one 
stakeholder in the decision making process (Roy, 1985:173-174). When all effects have 
been studied and evaluated (using criteria, criterion weights, criterion scores and an 
aggregation procedure), stakeholder issues can be studied more closely (Belton, 
2002:60). A first option is to design a traditional value structure, i.e., a criteria structure 
identical for all stakeholders, but whereby each stakeholder is given the possibility to 
enter his individual preferences through specific weights. This can be achieved e.g., 
through implementing a specific type of sensitivity analysis, called “scenario analysis”, 
see De Brucker (2000) and Macharis et al. (2006). In conventional scenario analysis, 
each scenario reflects the situation whereby only the criterion weights associated with 
one specific stakeholder point of view (e.g., an environmental or a safety point of view) 
are taken into account. The other criteria receive a weight equal to zero. This approach 
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can then be repeated for several stakeholder points of view. A second option is to design 
a value structure that – as a whole – is not necessarily shared by everyone. Here, a 
different module in the overall model is constructed for each stakeholder, whereby all 
criteria contributing to the objectives of that specific stakeholder are clustered together. 
This is the “multi-actor multi-criteria analysis” (MAMCA) approach (see, e.g., 
Macharis, 2000, 2004, 2007). With this methodology, a “layer” that includes the 
stakeholders is added to the traditional MCA model. Each stakeholder group can then 
assess the different alternatives in terms of its own objectives/criteria. 
According to Belton (2002:60) both above approaches are valuable, but the second 
approach is the most appropriate if the different stakeholder groups indeed have very 
different concerns, as manifested in different criteria sets. Here, substantial (potential) 
conflict exists among stakeholder priorities. This approach makes it possible to assess 
the extent to which stakeholder preferences are conflicting or converging. In this 
context, the MCA makes it possible to monitor and even reduce societal conflicts. 
Conflict resolution (or management) is the essence of economics, according to the old 
institutionalism view of Commons (1934). Attention to stakeholders represents the link 
between MCA and the institutionalism view. The applications described in section 5 
illustrate this link in a more concrete fashion. 
In addition, the institutional approach can be used in an evolutionary context. 
According to Arthur (1999) and Amendola and Gaffard (1998) economic structures are 
path-dependent as they can crystallize around small, random events (e.g., in the context 
of on-line services we can observe random interface improvements, new offerings, 
word-of-mouth recommendations, etc.) and lock-in behaviour, which can then trigger 
substantive policy changes. The application of MCA also embodies such an 
evolutionary element. Stakeholder preferences (and hence their priorities) are dynamic. 
For example, the MCA may identify a level of conflict on subsidiary aspects of project 
design and implementation, but with consensus arising about the principle that the 
project should be approved in some form. Decision makers may then decide to adopt a 
gradual (i.e., an evolutionary) path towards project implementation. For example, via re-
design of subsidiary project features, conflicts may be reduced, and such conflict 
reduction can then be measured by performing a second MCA after the re-design. 
Indeed, in some cases, a gradual approach may be the most appropriate to managing the 
problem at hand. Beliefs and preferences are actually endogenous and the application of 
MCA has the potential to mould these further, and to create mutual understanding, as 
expressed in Blaug’s (1992:130) statement “Decision-makers do not try to get what they 
want, rather they learn to want by appraising what they get”. In such a situation, the 
decision-making context can be very fluid, and the stability created by the institution 
ephemeral. One may therefore move very quickly from one temporary equilibrium to 
another. An example of rapid moves from one equilibrium to the next, is the gradual 
adoption of regulations restricting smoking in Belgium.1 An example of the other 
                                                 
1
 The development of smoking restrictions in public areas in Belgium represents a good example of a 
situation whereby temporary equilibria have followed one another very quickly. Such sequence of 
equilibria builds upon rapid changes in stakeholder preferences and the willingness to adapt to “good 
practices” from other countries. Pope Urban VII (1590) was the first to implement a smoking ban valid 
for Catholic churches. In 1624 a papal bull banning smoking from all catholic churches and places of 
worship was issued by Pope Urban VIII on grounds that tobacco use prompts sneezing, which too closely 
resembles sexual ecstasy. One had to wait until 1987 for such ban to be implemented for health reasons in 
all public buildings with the exception of the catering sector. The societal dialogue on a possible smoking 
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extreme (i.e., of a very stable context) is the continued survival of the essential features 
of civil (or Napoleonic) law. As regards decisions on transport infrastructure, the 
temporary equilibrium created by a decision usually lasts a number of years, typically 
five years until a single investment project is built and fully operational to 30 years in 
the context of a long-term development plan (Dooms, 2010). 
A more formal and systematic application of the stakeholder-driven MCA method as 
described above might greatly benefit the implementation of complex projects or policy 
measures. 
 
 
3. Institutional elements in neo-classical project evaluation  
 
We have argued above that multi-criteria analysis (MCA) fits well with the 
institutional approach to project evaluation. Below, we focus on institutional aspects 
present in the neo-classical approach, and in particular in social cost-benefit analysis 
(SCBA). SCBA is a static evaluation tool and the institutional elements embodied in 
SCBA are largely implicit and therefore often ignored by decision makers. 
Nevertheless, these institutional elements may strongly affect SCBA outcomes. An 
extended version of the brief analysis below can be found in De Brucker and Verbeke 
(2007). 
The traditional neo-classical approach to economics largely ignores the impact of 
institutions. An institution-free state is implicitly assumed in the neo-classical approach. 
A closer look at this approach however, suggests that the neo-classical approach builds 
implicitly on a set of important institutions, namely (1) private property rights; (2) 
markets where supply meets demand; (3) competition at the supply side (and 
                                                                                                                                               
ban in the catering industry led to a rapid sequence of events. First, as of 1990 an agreement was reached 
at the Federal level to implement partial smoking restrictions (though only rarely enforced) in restaurants 
and pubs. Here, smoking became limited to two thirds of the relevant commercial surface area in 1990 
and half of the surface area in 1992, but only for larger catering businesses with a commercial floor 
surface of more than 50 m2. This approach was augmented with a requirement for compulsory smoke 
aspiration systems for all catering businesses. Second, in 2006 a complete smoking ban was introduced 
for catering businesses that are part of a sports complex, a shopping mall or a multi-purpose room (unless 
the space for the catering activity was fully separated from the space dedicated to these other activities). 
Third, in 2007 followed a complete smoking ban in all restaurants and small snack houses, i.e., catering 
businesses with food cost inputs representing less than one third of total purchased cost inputs (i.e., food 
and beverage inputs taken together). Fourth, in 2010 the smoking ban was extended to all snack houses 
and a Federal law was adopted that will extend the smoking ban to all catering businesses, including pubs, 
by 2014 at the latest. However, on 15 March 2011, the Belgian Constitutional Court determined that the 
distinction made (even though only a temporary one, i.e., until 2014) between pubs serving snacks and 
those serving no snacks constitutes a violation of the principles of non-discrimination embedded in the 
Belgian constitution. As a consequence of this decision, smoking will be restricted to secluded smoking 
rooms within all catering businesses in Belgium, including all types of pubs, as of 1 July 2011. The 
smoking room will need to be completely secluded from the remainder of the business, and have four 
walls, a roof and a door, ànd it will need to be a self-service area only. In addition, the smoking room will 
need to respect specific limits regarding surface area and it will need to contain an air ventilation system. 
In the future, further regulatory changes are likely, as a societal dialogue may start regarding further 
limits to smoking, e.g., in private hotel rooms, flats for the elderly, private cars and private houses where 
children or cleaning staff may be present. In a final stage, severe restrictions or even a complete ban may 
be imposed on the sale and import of tobacco, which already exists in a few countries (e.g. Bhutan). 
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competition law); (4) a well-functioning price mechanism and (5) a unit of account (a 
“numéraire”). As SCBA is based on the concept of willingness-to-pay (to obtain a good 
or property), the institution of property rights is essential. Property rights can only be 
traded in a market. However, markets do not always emerge spontaneously, but 
sometimes may need to be created artificially (e.g., markets for tradable pollution rights 
or surrogate markets constructed just for the purpose of valuing a specific good). Even 
when markets emerge spontaneously, a minimum level of regulation may be necessary. 
Markets are only able to produce a Pareto optimal equilibrium price, if competition law 
safeguards the presence of competition. The presence of a generally accepted numéraire 
such as the Euro is also essential to SCBA. 
At the project level, when performing an actual SCBA, some additional institutions in 
the sense of “decision procedures” or “rules of the game” implicitly play an important 
role. First, interpersonal utility comparisons are always made at the project level. In 
SCBA, the main decision criterion is usually the project’s net present value (NPV) (or a 
criterion related to NPV). The NPV is a single, synthetic criterion, supposed to include 
all relevant effects expressed in monetary terms. The actual monetary values considered 
in the SCBA are derived from the consumers’ willingness-to-pay and do not require the 
selection of additional weights for the different cost and benefit categories. Here, the 
NPV criterion directly follows from the Hicks-Kaldor criterion (Hicks, 1939:711 and 
Kaldor 1939:550). The Hicks-Kaldor criterion views a project as welfare increasing if 
the individuals experiencing an increase in utility (i.e., the “winners”) can compensate 
the individuals experiencing a decrease (i.e., the “losers”), and are still left with a higher 
utility level than before project execution. Applying this criterion requires interpersonal 
utility comparisons and at the same time implicit trade-offs are performed among 
project effects, though policy makers are not always aware of this. In the case of public 
sector projects, the NPV accrues to members of society, more specifically to particular 
stakeholder groups. In contrast, with private sector investments, the NPV (associated 
with additional profit) accrues to the shareholders. Most public sector projects (save for 
very general projects, such as universal health care in society), have clear distributional 
impacts, leading some stakeholders to “win” at the expense of others, thereby being 
“conflict sensitive”.  
Another institutional element embedded here is that the decision itself to perform a 
SCBA has institutional significance. Many projects, though having potential net 
benefits, are never taken into consideration or do not even come to the conceptualization 
phase, precisely because the potential benefits and costs are not assessed. Conversely, 
projects executed without a formal SCBA may result from the political willingness to 
provide benefits to particular stakeholders, with the costs borne by society at large. Ex 
post, project execution may in turn influence the NPV of other substitute projects.  
An interesting example in this context is the project regarding the upgrading and 
reactivation of the old international railway called “Iron Rhine”2 linking the port of 
                                                 
2
 The name “Iron Rhine” stems from the fact that this railway link was once considered an alternative to 
navigation on the river Rhine. The “Iron Rhine” railway connects Antwerp in Belgium to Duisburg in the 
German Ruhr area, through the Dutch province of Limbourg via Lier (BE), Herenthals (BE), Mol (BE), 
Neerpelt (BE), Weert (NL), Roermond (NL) and Mönchen-Gladbach (DE). The right of transfer through 
the Dutch province of Limbourg (i.e., that part of Limbourg east of the river Meuse) was guaranteed to 
Belgium by the then major powers (i.e., France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia) and laid down 
in the Separation Treaty of 1839, recognizing the independence of Belgium. The railway was opened in 
1879 and continued to be a succesful and busy railway until the eve of the first world war. After the first 
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Antwerp in Belgium with its hinterland in the Ruhr area in Germany, through the Dutch 
province of Limbourg. The debate regarding this project is highly complex and touches 
upon international and politically sensitive issues, which have their origins in the 
Principles of Separation of the former United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, as 
laid down in the subsequent Separation Treaty of 1839. A more detailed description of 
the history, the complexities and the nature of this issue can be found in Witlox (2006). 
A SCBA was recently performed for this project (Delhaye et al., 2009). The decision 
to establish a commission of independent experts (and to perform this SCBA) was the 
consequence of a decision rendered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague to which both countries (Belgium and The Netherlands) decided to submit their 
conflict. The overall result (i.e., from the international point of view) of this SCBA is 
negative, though the NPV from a Belgian perspective is positive. One reason for this 
poor result is the presence of spare capacity on competing railway routes (inter alia, the 
Montzen route), so that the project does not attract much traffic from the highly 
polluting road mode. In addition, the investment cost is very high because of the 
environmental and safety guarantees asked for by The Netherlands. However, the main 
reason for the negative outcome is likely that particular prior decisions were taken in the 
past regarding the provision of transport services and the design of a particular (rail) 
infrastructure network in the Netherlands, largely guided by political motives and 
unrelated to the NPV outcomes of specific projects. The rail links competing with the 
Iron Rhine rail project, namely the Montzen route,3 the Brabant route4 and the more 
recent Betuwe route5 were implemented in the past either without formal SCBAs, or, in 
the case of the Betuwe route, notwithstanding serious criticism from the Dutch Court of 
Auditors and a number of Dutch academics. The former projects were implemented 
mainly to satisfy concentrated stakeholder interests, within a broader institutional 
                                                                                                                                               
world war, it continued to be used on a rather modest scale since a competing line, namely the Montzen 
route (see infra) was built by the German occupying force in 1917. Finally, the Iron Rhine rail link ceased 
to operate, as part of the infrastructure was dismantled by the Dutch government in 1997. 
3
 The Montzen route connects Antwerp (BE) to the German Ruhr area via Lier (BE), Aarschot (BE), 
Diest (BE), Hasselt (BE), Tongeren (BE), Visé (BE), Montzen (BE) and Aachen (DE). This line was 
constructed during the first world war by the German occupying force for military purposes, since this 
line avoids the passage over the Dutch (i.e., neutral) territory. After the first world war the latter route 
continued to be used, although it is about 50 km longer and more hilly than the Iron Rhine route. The 
reasons were that with the Montzen route one could avoid one border passage, that it generates more 
revenue for the Belgian railway company (as it is a longer journey) and that it passes through the Walloon 
region of Belgium where the handling of trains creates economic activity and jobs for that region. 
4
 The Brabant route is an existing railway route south of the new Betuwe route (see infra) and connects 
the port of Rotterdam (as well as the more southernly located ports of Vlissingen and even partly 
Antwerp) to the hinterland in the German Ruhr area via Breda (NL), Eindhoven (NL), Tilburg (NL), 
Venlo (NL), Viersen (DE). The Brabant route is actually saturated and the construction of the new 
Betuwe route (see infra) reduces congestion on the former route. However, the reactivation and upgrading 
of the old Iron Rhine rail link would have served this same purpose, if it had been built (i.e., upgraded and 
reactivated) before the Betuwe route was built (which was not the case). 
5
 The Betuwe route is named after the Betuwe region (i.e., a fruit-growing region in The Netherlands) 
through which it passes. It is a new railway link recently constructed, more or less parallel to the already 
existing track in the same region (which was called “Betuwe line”). The Betuwe route connects the port 
of Rotterdam (NL) with its hinterland in the German Ruhr area. The Betuwe route was bundled most of 
the time with the motorway A15 and goes over Goringem (NL), Tiel (NL), Elst (NL), Zevenaar (NL) and 
Emmerich (DE).  
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context allowing for this to occur. For instance, the recent decision of the Dutch 
government to implement the Betuwe route was based on strategic motives, in particular 
its expected benefits for the port of Rotterdam, at the expense of competing foreign 
ports such as Antwerp in Belgium, which interestingly would have benefited most from 
the Iron Rhine project. In the more distant past, the old Montzen route was built for 
military purposes during World War I. Hence, the Belgian government wanting to 
safeguard the competitiveness and the future of the port of Antwerp (in terms of 
providing to shippers a selection of good hinterland connections with multiple transport 
modes, including rail) can do little more than pushing for the implementation of the Iron 
Rhine project, even in the face of disappointing SCBA outcomes. Here, Witlox (2006) 
correctly concludes that the case of the Iron Rhine is intrinsically an issue of 
international (port) competition.  
Any SCBA implicitly includes a number of institutional elements, but ultimately, it 
does remain an unsatisfactory, static evaluation tool, unable to accommodate fully the 
dynamics of complex decision-making processes, especially those processes that trigger 
institutional change through moulding beliefs and preferences. 
 
 
4. Does the institutional approach guarantee a societal optimum? 
 
In the institutional approach outlined above, stakeholders are considered the main 
drivers of decision-making processes. Two critical comments should be made here. 
First, stakeholder objectives are seldom converging, e.g., in the case of transport 
projects the objectives of the logistics sector are often opposed to those of 
environmental pressure groups. However, increased convergence of stakeholder 
objectives can occur. For example, the objectives of environmental pressure groups may 
converge with those in the logistics sector if an infrastructure project is re-designed to 
allow simultaneously for better logistics efficiency and lower externalities (e.g., as in 
replacing a new bridge project with high atmospheric, noise and visual pollution by a 
tunnel, as is the case for the present ringroad extension project in Antwerp). The 
question can therefore be asked whether a substantial amount of conflict necessarily acts 
as an impediment or can in some cases actually improve project design and 
implementation, i.e., improve the project and the decision-making associated with the 
project. Second, some stakeholder groups may be more powerful than others. The 
(temporary) institutional equilibrium resulting from the counterbalancing power of the 
various stakeholders’ actions is not necessarily distributionally neutral. More powerful 
stakeholders in society may try to institutionalize a (temporary) socio-economic 
equilibrium that provides them a (temporary) distributional advantage. They may try to 
do this either directly, through the implementation of specific projects benefiting them, 
or more indirectly, through influencing the design and organization of the institutions 
meant to evaluate and decide on projects.  
De Brucker and Verbeke (2007) describe in greater detail the above issues. They 
conclude that a manageable level of conflict can function as a catalyst for creative 
stakeholder involvement, learning and possibly project re-design, thereby potentially 
moving project implementation from a win-lose to a win-win situation, see also Mullins 
(2005:904-905). When applying MCA, creativity may be enhanced when value-focused 
thinking (Keeney, 1996) is applied. This implies that a set of relevant values (to be 
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measured by criteria) is made explicit at the outset. These values may be conflicting. In 
a following step, projects are “constructed”. This means that one proactively searches 
for projects that are acceptable to all stakeholders. This is done through an iterative 
learning process. Here, projects are not considered as exogenous since they too evolve 
in the learning process. The learning process is at least partly driven by the concern for 
reducing conflict. 
On the issue of the possible distributional bias of institutions, De Brucker and 
Verbeke (2007) described a number of mechanisms that can reduce the rent-seeking 
behaviour of strategically positioned actors or stakeholders (see also Knight, 1998:40ff). 
These mechanisms act on two levels, namely at the level of the institution itself (i.e., 
regarding the design of the “rules of the game”) and at the level of project evaluation in 
particular (i.e., when “playing the game”). These general mechanisms address problems 
related to transaction costs, uncertainty, cross-cutting effects, competition and state 
intervention. In this respect, the role of a third party such as the state or a state agency is 
very important in order to enhance the bargaining power of weak stakeholders, 
especially in the context of project evaluation. This can be achieved through (1) 
protecting free association, (2) establishing rules or criteria for recognizing the 
bargaining rights of specific stakeholder groups; (3) establishing stakeholder 
recognition procedures to give standing to affected stakeholders.  
Knight (1998:203) argues that poorly organized stakeholders typically turn to the state 
for formal protection, whereas powerful stakeholders prefer to negotiate in an 
unconstrained market. Hence, the trade-off from the government’s perspective is either 
to design very restrictive rules that protect negatively affected stakeholders against the 
externalities created by new infrastructure development or, alternatively, to allow these 
stakeholders, such as environmental protection groups, to mobilize against project 
developers, to voice their concerns and possibly to influence the outcome of the project 
evaluation, thereby reducing the need for formal rules. 
Finally, the role of sensitivity analysis should not be underestimated. Sensitivity 
analysis and scenario analysis can play an important role in detecting significant 
distributional consequences. Sensitivity analysis can be performed to identify the impact 
of changing policy weights. For example, one can change the weights associated with 
the criteria viewed important by a specific stakeholder and observe whether this has a 
substantial impact on the final outcome, see the next section.  
To conclude, the excessive power of some stakeholders can be counterbalanced if 
each stakeholder can effectively participate in the decision-making process. When 
designing formal decision procedures aimed at accommodating stakeholders’ 
objectives, this issue should be given special attention. The state can act as a network 
hub to provide and organize a forum for stakeholder discussion and debate, i.e., a forum 
for balancing stakeholders’ power and to ensure that each stakeholder group has equal 
rights and opportunities to let its views be known. The role of the state as a network hub 
also consists of further investigating possible distributional consequences of projects 
(e.g., through extensive sensitivity analysis in MCA). The institutional approach has the 
advantage that the conflicting interests among stakeholders become more explicit 
(“ordered complexity”) and that they can, therefore, be better controlled, monitored and 
moulded. As is the case with democracy, the collective benefit of this approach does not 
result from individual actions by stakeholders; rather, it is a by-product of a process 
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whereby individual actors or stakeholders pursue their own, selfish ends.6 None of these 
actors or stakeholders pursues the public good, but through acting in a pluralistic forum, 
collective benefits may ultimately arise as a by-product of this process. The outcome of 
this process can be viewed as “agreed upon subjectivity” or “subjectivity made 
objective”. A parallel can also be drawn with markets. Individual participants in markets 
(producers and consumers) pursue their own selfish ends (e.g., profits), but when 
considering all their actions together, an optimum may emerge as a by-product, 
provided that the price mechanism works efficiently, and that power asymmetries and 
other market imperfections do not arise. The institutional approach (using MCA) has the 
additional advantage, as compared to the neoclassical approach (using SCBA), that it 
can better accommodate the dynamics of complex decision processes and that it can be 
used as a trigger for change and for the moulding of beliefs and preferences, as well as 
the ensuing behaviour of actors. 
 
 
5. Applications of the institutional approach to transport project evaluation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the sections above, we have argued that stakeholders play an important role in the 
institutional approach to transport project evaluation. In addition, stakeholder relations 
can be managed more effectively using MCA. Hence, MCA adoption can be considered 
an important element in the institutional approach to transport project evaluation. There 
are, however, a large number of MCA methods and approaches, and not all of them are 
equally appropriate in the context of an institutional approach. The important building 
blocks of an MCA method that would make it fit well with the institutional approach 
include (1) the possibility to design a value structure (and associated criteria) allowing 
effective stakeholder management, e.g., because criteria sets can be directly linked to 
specific stakeholders); (2) sufficient flexibility, thereby allowing interactive and 
constructivist processes whereby various stakeholders can truly participate in the 
decision making process and “construct” together a solution acceptable to all (thereby 
also achieving what can be called “subjectivity made objective”) and (3) high 
transparency to policy makers, stakeholders and the public at large, in terms of how 
applying specific values, criteria and impact measures have led to a final outcome 
(“ordered complexity”). 
In the following sections, we present a few case studies, with a focus on the issue of 
stakeholder management, which is critical to the institutional approach. For technical 
details on the MCA adopted, see Macharis et al., (2007).  
 
                                                 
6 This way of thinking is consistent with the view on institutions underlying Schotter’s (1981:5) definition 
of economics: “Economics is the study of how individual economic agents pursuing their own selfish 
ends evolve institutions as a means to satisfy them”. In this definition, intentional design and the pursuit 
of distributional advantage are assumed to exist on behalf of the stakeholders. It is, therefore, the task of 
an external actor (such as the state or a state agency) to organize a pluralistic forum where the powers of 
various stakeholder groups effectively counterbalance each other. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 47 (2011): 3-24 
 
 
14 
5.2 Case study 1: the IN-SAFETY project 
 
The IN-SAFETY7 project is an EU funded research project under the sixth framework 
programme in which 29 partners from 12 different countries participated. A number of 
work packages were carried out by the authors of this article whose contribution 
consisted of prioritising a number of highly innovative alternatives (or tools) aimed at 
increasing road safety by creating a more forgiving road (FOR) and more self-
explaining road (SER) environment. A self-explaining road (SER) is a road that is 
constructed in such a way that it evokes and stimulates correct driving behaviour and 
therefore diminishes the chance on driver errors (Theeuwes and Godthelp, 1992). A 
forgiving road (FOR) is designed in such a manner that it counteracts or prevents 
driving errors and minimizes the negative effects of those driving errors (Wegman and 
Aarts, 2005). In the IN-SAFETY project, a number of proposals that can contribute to 
the development of a more SER and FOR environment were compared and ranked in 
order to determine their implementation priority. 
As the main objective of the present contribution is to illustrate how the objectives of 
stakeholders can be adequately captured and assessed in a MCA, we will mainly focus 
on (1) the design of a stakeholder-driven value structure; (2) the generation of 
alternatives based on value-focused thinking; and (3) the exploration of the (diverging) 
stakeholder priorities. For other, more technical issues such as the technical aspects of 
the alternatives studied, the actual generation of priorities (deriving criterion scores, 
weights and aggregating these), see the entire project deliverable (Macharis et al., 2008) 
and some chapters in a book dedicated to this topic (De Brucker et al., 2011 and 
Dangelmaier et al., 2011). 
 
• The design of a stakeholder driven-value structure 
 
After a number of technical workshops and extensive discussions with experts, policy 
makers and representatives from stakeholders, a value (criteria) structure as shown in 
Figure 1 was developed. This hierarchy of criteria was constructed according to the 
principles of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) of Saaty (1977, 1986, 1988, 1995). 
However, it was the policy makers (and stakeholder representatives) who ultimately had 
the last word in the decision regarding the final structure of the criterion tree.  
The top level of the evaluation tree shown in Figure 1 represents the focus or overall 
objective, namely creating benefits by making the road environment more forgiving and 
more self-explanatory. At the second level, three groups of main stakeholders are 
considered, namely (1) the users, (2) society/authorities and (3) manufacturers. Within 
each group of stakeholders, a number of subcategories was identified, such as drivers, 
fleet owners and emergency centres (for the main category “users”), road managers and 
authorities (for the main category “authorities”) and vehicle manufacturers, equipment 
manufacturers, system providers and content providers (for the main category 
“manufacturers”). As regards these subcategories, it turned out to be unnecessary to 
include them as separate groups, since the preferences of these subgroups were not 
substantially different from each other and since some of these subgroups did not feel 
compelled to organize themselves so as to exert a substantial influence on policy 
                                                 
7
 IN-SAFETY is the abbreviation for “INfrastructure and SAFETY”. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 47 (2011): 3-24 
 
 
15 
making. On the third level, the criteria are listed that are considered relevant by these 
main stakeholders. The lowest level shows the alternatives to be prioritised. 
 
USERS 
drivers/fleet owners/emerg.centr. 
SOCIETY/AUTHORITIES 
road managers / authorities 
MANUFACTURERS 
car man./equip.man./syst.prov./content prov. 
Driver 
comfort
Full user 
cost 
Driver 
safety 
Travel time 
duration 
Network 
effic. 
Public 
expend. 
Overall 
safety 
Environm. 
effects 
Socio-pol. 
acceptance 
Investm. 
risk 
Liability 
risk 
Techn. 
feasib. 
OVERALL BENEFITS OF FORGIVING AND 
SELFEXPLAINING ROADS 
Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 … Scen. n 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Level 4 
 
Figure 1: Decision hierarchy for the prioritisation of FOR and SER scenarios. 
Source: The authors and IN-SAFETY project team, based on the AHP (Macharis et al., 2008:23). 
 
It should be noted that the second stakeholder (at level 2) in Figure 1 in fact represents 
the point of view of public policy makers in general. The subsystem that is formed by 
this stakeholder and all its lower level elements is the most important one, since it 
represents the overall societal point of view. The two remaining subsystems, formed 
respectively by the users (i.e., the demand side of the market) and the manufacturers 
(i.e., the supply side) and their lower level elements, are also important, but in another 
context. Successful implementation of alternatives by public policy makers (i.e., the 
middle subsystem) is indeed only possible if the decisions made or the options chosen 
by these public policy makers are in accord with, at least to a certain extent, with the 
interests of the other stakeholders. If this is the case, then the pursuit of public policy 
objectives will be facilitated by the actions taken by the other stakeholders and it will be 
easier for public policy makers to have their preferences implemented. This way of 
using stakeholder management as facilitating (or hindering) public policy 
implementation is fully in line with the actual definition of the concept of “stakeholder” 
by Freeman, as referred to in section 2 above. The MCA to be performed, therefore, 
needs to be designed in such a way, so as to be able to investigate the extent to which 
the solutions chosen within the second subsystem (public policy view) are compatible 
with the solutions preferred by the users and the manufacturers, and whether this 
compatibility needs to be improved (or not), using a specific implementation path 
designed for this purpose. The essence of this approach is that the priorities derived 
from the public policy perspective are taken as the starting point for further analysis. In 
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the further analysis, differences are explored, and a comparison is made with the other 
two stakeholders’ priorities. However, there need not be a formal aggregation of the 
different stakeholders’ priorities, e.g., through calculating some average. In a perfect 
market (which is the standard assumption in neo-classical economics), the priorities 
derived at the demand side of the market would be expected to be fully consistent with 
the ones derived at the supply side, and government or public policy intervention (this is 
the middle subsystem in Figure 1) would not be an important issue. It is thus assumed 
that what would be good for individual users would also be good for society. This is 
definitely not the case here and several reasons can be identified for this situation. First, 
there are a number of external effects, such as effects on safety (including third party 
safety effects, such as effects on pedestrians and cyclists) and environmental effects, 
etc. Second, infrastructure and also safety have the character of a public good, which 
can only be financed with government funds, to be allocated by public policy makers. 
Third, there may be bounded rationality challenges, and consumer preferences may be 
inconsistent over time. When deciding on the type of goods to buy, consumers often 
have a preference for goods resulting in immediate but short-lived benefits, and 
associated with large costs or sacrifices in the future (e.g., road accidents). These future 
costs or sacrifices are often underestimated at the time the decision is made. This means 
that market intervention by public policy makers is required here. Fourth, the tools or 
systems analysed are highly innovative and the market for them still has to be 
developed. In such cases, government incentives or an active supply side policy by 
government can be instrumental to stimulating and forming the institutional structures 
of this evolving market. The decision-making problem public policy makers are 
confronted with is, therefore, not a simple but a complex one and the hierarchical 
structure developed here (Figure 1) should be viewed as an attempt to order this 
complexity. 
 
• The development of a set of alternatives 
 
The development of a set of alternatives to be prioritised was done using a two-step 
procedure. Given the highly innovative character of the alternative systems to be 
developed, a type of value-focused thinking (Keeney, 1996) was applied in the first 
phase. In this first (or conceptualisation) phase a set of preliminary alternative scenarios 
was generated, by combining the six main causes for accidents, namely (1) excessive 
speed in unexpected sharp bends, (2) speeding in general, (3) violation of priority rules, 
(4) wrong use of the road, (5) failure when overtaking and (6) insufficient safety 
distance, with three dimensions, along which scenarios can be developed namely (1) the 
vehicle, (2) the infrastructure and (3) the vehicle-infrastructure interface. By doing so, a 
total of 18 generic categories of potential alternatives were obtained. These should be 
considered as alternative venues for the design of innovative systems. For each 
category, some typical examples were identified, as shown in Table 1. The first row of 
Table 1 represents the three dimensions; the first column reflects the six top errors and 
the remaining cells represent typical examples the 18 alternative ways of developing 
potential alternative scenarios. 
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Table 1: Generation of alternatives by combining errors and dimensions along which tools can be 
developed. 
Dimension 
Error 
In-vehicle Infrastructure-based Cooperative (vehicle-
infrastructure) 
Too fast in 
unexpected 
sharp bends 
Unexpected sharp bends 
registered red in a 
digital map of the 
navigation-system are 
presented to driver 
Vehicle is ‘analyzed’ 
(e.g., speed), VMS 
signals the danger of the 
bend depending on the 
actual speed 
Electronic beacons (special 
reflection posts) give 
additional information on dis-
plays in the vehicle about the 
road (e.g., warning: sharp 
bend) 
Speeding Speed alert system 
functioning by 
recognition of traffic 
signs 
Speed limit is presented 
to driver by VMS under 
consideration of special 
environmental 
circumstances 
Speed alert system, based on 
digital maps containing legal 
speed limits with additional 
info on recommended safe 
speed 
Violation of 
priority rules 
Traffic sign recognition Traffic signs Traffic light status 
information emission to car 
Wrong use of 
the road 
LDWA (Lane Departure 
Warning Assistant) 
Audible delineation Adaptive LDWA; Sensitivity 
of LDWA is adapted in spe-
cial conditions (road 
works,tunnels) 
Failure when 
overtaking 
Blind spot detection 
warning driver if a 
vehicle is approaching 
from behind 
Separation of lanes by 
rumble strips where 
overtaking is forbidden 
Cooperative system warning 
of oncoming vehicles by 
vehicle-to-vehicle 
communication 
Insufficient 
safety distance 
Advanced Cruise 
Control (ACC) 
Fog detection warning 
system; VMS warning 
ACC set by local on-site 
weather system: Dynamic 
ACC 
Source: IN-SAFETY project team (Macharis et al., 2008:21). 
 
On the basis of a preliminary prioritisation of these potential systems in terms of 
stakeholder objectives (see below) and after extensive discussions with experts, a set of 
more concrete implementation scenarios8 was selected for final prioritization in the 
step 2. These systems are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 We adopt the term “scenario” because each system studied is described in terms of a number of 
parameters such as road type, traffic conditions, etc., as compared to a “reference scenario”, see Macharis 
et al., (2008:38ff). 
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Table 2: Summary of a detailed scenario description. 
No./ Name Description Type of 
system 
Data needed 
for operation 
Data collection 
for operation 
Condition 
requirement 
Reference 
scenario for 
evaluation 
Main 
contributing 
factor for 
target 
accidents 
Pilot 
studies 
1. In-car 
Variable 
Message Signs 
(VMS) info 
(dynamic legal 
speed limit 
motorways) 
Self-explaining 
system  
Dynamic speed 
limit based on 
weather and 
traffic 
conditions 
Roadside 
VMS  
Warning 
into vehicle 
Current speed, 
environmental 
data, traffic 
volume/flow 
Vehicle sensors, 
roadside sensors 
Reliable 
detection 
systems, 
algorithms for 
calculating safe 
speed 
(A) Current 
state 
(B) Roadside 
VMS, dynamic 
speed limit (no 
info into 
vehicle) 
Inappropriate 
speed on 
motorways 
Greek, 
Italian, 
German 
pilots 
 
2. In-car 
school  
bus ahead  
warning 
Self-explaining 
system 
Warning when 
school bus 
stops ahead 
Warning 
from bus 
into vehicle 
Vehicle 
location, 
school bus 
location 
Vehicle 
equipment for 
vehicle-to-
vehicle 
communication 
Reliable 
detection 
systems, 
reliable radio 
transmitter & 
receiver  
No in-vehicle 
warning 
 
Not detecting 
school children 
after leaving or 
before entering 
a school bus 
Swedish 
pilot 
3. In-car 
curve speed 
warning 
(rural roads) 
Self-explaining 
system  
Safe curve 
speed 
calculated 
based on curve 
geometry and 
weather 
conditions 
Vehicle 
autonomous 
Current speed, 
curve 
geometry, 
environmental 
data, vehicle 
characteristics 
Digital maps, 
vehicle sensors 
Reliable 
updated data 
basis for 
infrastructure 
conditions, 
algorithms for 
calculating safe 
speed 
No in-vehicle 
warning 
Inappropriate 
speed in curves 
on rural roads 
- 
4. In-car lane 
departure  
warnings  
(LDWA) 
(motorways) 
Forgiving 
system  
Lane departure 
warnings based 
on lane 
markings + 
road side 
beacons in 
work zone 
Warning 
into vehicle  
 
Lane markings, 
speed, local 
conditions 
(e.g., road 
works) 
Vehicle sensors 
(LDWA) 
Road side 
beacons 
(adaptive 
LDWA) 
Lane markings, 
reliable 
detection 
systems 
(A) No lane 
departure 
warning 
(B) Rumble 
strips no 
measures at 
road works 
Lane departure  
on motorways 
Swedish, 
German,  
Greek 
pilots 
5. Overtaking 
assistant 
“blind spot 
vehicle 
detection” 
(more than 
1 lane per 
direction) 
Forgiving 
system 
Warning when 
overtaking 
while vehicle 
approaching 
from behind 
Vehicle 
autonomous 
Position and 
speed of 
vehicle 
approaching in 
blind spot, 
current speed  
Vehicle sensors 
for detection of 
vehicle behind 
Reliable 
detection 
systems 
No overtaking 
assistance 
Overseeing 
vehicle 
approaching 
from behind 
while 
overtaking 
- 
6. Overtaking 
assistant 
oncoming 
vehicle 
detection 
(1 lane per 
direction) 
Forgiving 
system  
Warning when 
overtaking 
with oncoming 
traffic 
Vehicle-to-
vehicle 
communi-
cation 
Location and 
speed of own 
vehicle and 
oncoming 
traffic 
Vehicle sensors, 
equipment for 
vehicle-to-
vehicle 
communication 
Reliable 
detection and 
communication 
systems 
No overtaking 
assistance 
Overseeing 
oncoming 
traffic while 
overtaking 
- 
Source: IN-SAFETY project team (Macharis et al., 2008:37). 
 
• Deriving and exploring the stakeholder priorities 
 
Stakeholder priorities were derived in both steps of the IN-SAFETY project according 
to the criteria set shown in Figure 1. Experts derived scores at the lowest level of the 
value structure, i.e., when comparing actions (at level 4) in terms of their contribution to 
criteria (shown at level 3). As regards the level of the criteria (level 3), priorities or 
weights (i.e., the relative importance of the stakeholders’ objectives) (shown at level 2) 
were derived by the stakeholders themselves. To this end, the pairwise comparison 
mechanism of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) of Saaty (1977, 1986, 1988, 1995) 
was used. This is an interactive tool whereby respondents (i.e., stakeholder 
representatives) compare the elements at a lower level (i.e., the criteria) in terms of their 
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contribution to a higher-level element (i.e., stakeholder objectives) using a nine point 
scale. These pairwise comparisons are then aggregated so as to obtain local and global 
relative priorities. This was done using the eigenvector method underlying Saaty’s AHP 
method. 
At the end of the first step (which was related to the evaluation of alternative venues 
for the design of the innovative systems), we obtained a prioritisation in terms of the 
three actors or stakeholders. By doing so, it was possible to assess the degree to which 
the preferences of the stakeholders (users and manufacturers) are conflicting or 
converging and to which extent they are compatible with the priorities in terms of a 
public policy point of view (stakeholder “society”). The conclusion from the latter point 
of view was that alternatives focused on speeding are considered the most desirable. 
However, these systems are not considered desirable from the point of view of the 
manufacturers or users. Manufacturers consider the autonomous, infrastructure-based 
alternatives (e.g., traffic signs, separation of lanes by rumble strips, VMS signalling the 
danger of the bend, audible delineation, etc.) to be the most desirable. This is mainly 
caused by the liability problems involved in vehicle alternatives, which is the most 
important criterion for the manufacturers. Users most often rank the vehicle-related 
alternatives (e.g., advanced cruise control, lane departure warning assistant) at the 
bottom (with the exception of alternatives regarding bends and failure while 
overtaking). To a large extent, this is caused by the costs accruing to the user, and also 
to the relatively smaller effects on driver safety, as these are the most important criteria 
for the user. 
The insights obtained at the end of the first phase were then used to select a set of 
more concrete implementation scenarios. These were also submitted to a prioritisation 
in terms of the different stakeholder objectives (in step 2). The most striking conclusion 
from the final prioritisation in step two is the high discrepancy among stakeholder 
priorities for some scenarios, whereas for other scenarios this discrepancy was rather 
low. For instance, for scenario no. 6 (overtaking assistant with oncoming vehicle 
detection) and scenario no. 3 (safe curve speed warning), discrepancy is high. These 
scenarios are considered to be good in terms of societal objectives, but not in terms of 
manufacturers’ objectives. Manufacturers consider the risk associated with these 
scenarios as too high, in particular the liability risk, but also the investment risk and the 
risk of technical non-feasibility. Although this scenario has some market potential, it is 
not likely to hit the market in the near future. Further research is, therefore, needed to 
make this application more reliable and to reduce the risks associated with it. Here, 
policy makers should consider what measures could be taken to address the 
manufacturer’s hesitations with respect to the possible liability risks. 
A scenario receiving a good overall priority from the various stakeholders is, 
however, scenario no. 1 (VMS info into vehicle). This scenario will, therefore, more 
easily be implemented in the market through market forces, without the need for 
substantial governmental intervention.  
Another striking conclusion is obtained regarding the scenario no. 2 (school bus ahead 
warning), ranked at the bottom from society’s point of view. Accidents with children 
running out of a school bus only represent a small portion of the total number of 
accidents. Manufacturers, however, consider this scenario as being low risk. 
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5.3 Case study 2: the DHL project 
 
Another interesting case study is the possible operating and infrastructural extension 
of the air freight carrier DHL9 at Brussels (Zaventem) International Airport (Dooms et 
al., 2007a; Dooms et al., 2007b). This case was a highly conflictual one and was 
discussed extensively in the Belgian press during the period spanning September and 
October 2004. The Province of Flemish Brabant commissioned the study, and wanted to 
use the results as an input into a strategic decision-making process regarding the 
location of DHL’s future activities. A multi-stakeholder perspective was explicitly 
pursued, as the decision to be taken would have a substantial impact on the economic 
and natural environment. The stakeholders identified below were in a position to 
influence substantially the achievement of the company’s objectives. 
The alternative strategies to be evaluated using a multi-actor MCA were: (1) a pan-
European consolidation strategy with Brussels (Zaventem) airport as a super-hub, 
concentrating all European traffic at Brussels airport, whereby an environmental permit 
allowing for 35,000 night flights per year would be required, (2) a West-European 
expansion strategy with Brussels as one of the multi-hubs (requiring a permit for 25,000 
night flights per year), i.e., with the continuous existence of capacity in other regional 
sub-hubs in Europe; and (3) the further development of DHL in an external super-hub, 
which implied the relocation of the DHL hub from Brussels International Airport to e.g., 
Leipzig in Germany and a downgrading of the Brussels airport to a spoke in the DHL 
network (requiring only 13,000 movements a year). 
The stakeholders identified in this case study were: (1) the air freight carrier DHL; (2) 
the airport operator BIAC (Brussels International Airport Company); (3) the Belgian 
Government; and (4) the local community affected by the project. DHL was interested 
in criteria such as proximity to the market, market share growth and international 
logistics optimization. BIAC was interested in profitability, diversification of the traffic 
portfolio, high value-added activities, balanced growth and positioning of the airport. 
The government was interested in socio-economic criteria (value added, employment, 
regional competitiveness) and ecological objectives (health costs for government). The 
local community was interested in local employment and minimizing health impacts. 
A prioritization of the three alternative strategies in terms of each separate stakeholder 
was performed through the MCA. The application of this methodology clearly 
highlighted the conflictual nature of the decision-making context, in particular regarding 
the role of the Belgian government. As regards the super-hub position, the ranking in 
terms of the local community’s objectives turned out to be diametrically opposed to the 
ranking in terms of DHL’s objectives. The final results of this study turned out to be 
highly sensitive, which means that changing the weights of the criteria (or changing the 
stakeholder perspective) resulted in a vastly different final ranking. An interesting 
conclusion was related to the introduction of different time horizons into the analysis. 
With a 2012 time horizon, the global preference10 was for the multi-hub expansion, 
whereas a time horizon expanding to 2023 meant a shift of the global preference 
towards the super-hub choice. Such a shift was due to the capacity constraints faced by 
                                                 
9
 The abbreviation DHL stands for “Dalsey, Hillblom and Lynn”, founders of the DHL company. 
10
 In this case, the global preference was simply measured as the unweighted average preference of the 
various stakeholder groups considered. 
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DHL and BIAC in the short run that could be alleviated in the post-2012 period. On the 
basis of these findings it was concluded that the government had to provide a legal-
institutional framework with a time horizon stretching to 2023 that could secure the 
long-term growth of DHL’s activity (in terms of number of night flights allowed), 
especially after 2012. Without such a framework, the hub-activities of DHL would be 
relocated to another airport. In the short run, towards 2012, the MCA showed that 
Brussels airport had to be protected as a node in DHL’s multi-hub network. 
Another complication in this case was that “the government” in fact consisted of 
several layers of public agencies, namely the Belgian federal government, the 
governments of the Flemish and Brussels regions, the province and various 
municipalities. As it took too long to achieve a consensus among these different 
governments DHL finally decided to opt for the external super-hub choice in Leipzig. 
When interpreting the DHL case through an institutional lens, as outlined in earlier 
sections of this paper, it becomes obvious that the absence of an adequate institutional 
framework was an essential factor in this case. The key problem regarding night flights 
in Europe is that the institutional framework (in particular as regards acceptable noise 
level standards) is not uniform across countries or regions within countries. Each 
country and region applies different standards. Such differences in standards are even 
used by some governments to attract airport activities to their region. Once again, this is 
an example (just like in the Iron Rhine case referred to in section 4) of the institutional 
framework influencing the performance of a company as well as the results that would 
be obtained by using neo-classical evaluation instruments such as private investment 
analysis (PIA) or social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA). On a more positive note, it 
should be emphasized that the institutional framework is subject to change, and that 
neo-classical concepts such as (changes in) marginal utility can influence the 
institutional equilibrium in the future. For instance, in the case of the DHL company, 
which relocated its main hub to Leipzig, the extra activity (and ensuing income and 
jobs) were very much welcomed by the local population and the government of that 
region, as income levels per capita are rather low there. However, as income levels rise 
in the Leipzig region in the future, it can be expected that the preferences of the local 
population and government may change. The marginal utility of a higher income will 
decrease (as income becomes less scarce), whereas the marginal utility of enjoying 
environmental amenities may increase (as these become more scarce). Here, changes 
measured in terms of neo-classical concepts (or instruments) also affect the broader 
institutional context. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have shown that multi-criteria analysis (MCA), and in particular the multi-actor 
multi-criteria analysis can be usefully applied within an institutional approach to project 
evaluation. Stakeholders represent the linking pin between MCA as an evaluation tool 
and the institutional approach to project assessment. Institutional aspects are also 
present in the conventional, neo-classical approach to project evaluation, in particular 
when applying social cost-benefit analyses (SCBA), but only implicitly, so that they are 
usually neglected. In the MCA, however, institutional aspects are made explicit. This 
holds especially for the degree to which stakeholder preferences are conflicting or 
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converging. A well-designed implementation path (e.g., based on government 
incentives or a social marketing campaign) for alternatives characterized by diverging 
stakeholder priorities can increase the implementation potential of these alternatives. 
Indeed, stakeholder preferences are mostly dynamic and path-dependent. Hence, from 
an evolutionary perspective, the level of conflict may be lower in a second-round 
application of the MCA. In order to guarantee that the institutional approach, in 
particular the application of MCA, would lead to a social optimum that is 
distributionally neutral, state intervention is important. The latter should, inter alia, 
increase the bargaining power of weak actors. Only in such a case will a collective 
benefit or public good emerge (as a by-product) from the individual actions of self-
interested stakeholders. We illustrated this stakeholder-driven, institutional approach 
through the use of some recent case-studies.  
The more systematic application of a carefully designed, stakeholder-driven MCA as 
described in this contribution can improve substantially the quality of decision-making 
processes. Large transport projects associated with substantial conflicts in terms of 
diverging stakeholder objectives would greatly benefit from a more systematic 
application of such a method. Indeed, just as it is now a legal requirement to assess a 
project’s impact on the natural environment, one could argue that it should be 
mandatory to assess its impact on stakeholder objectives. In the realm of environmental 
project effects, the tool of (strategic) environmental impact assessment (S)EIA aims to 
“create” more effective alternatives that provide a better fit with the natural 
environment. Stakeholder impact analysis could have a similar effect on the 
“environment” (or community) of stakeholders. By bringing together all stakeholders in 
a carefully designed forum, and through applying the method presented in this paper, it 
may become much easier to construct and implement solutions acceptable to the 
community of stakeholders, thereby creating value added for society as a whole. 
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